Question 2. (25 pts.) Consider the following game which I refer to as Game 2: 1 2 C C2 GAME 2 L R U (6,8) (15,2) (12,7)

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Question 2 25 Pts Consider The Following Game Which I Refer To As Game 2 1 2 C C2 Game 2 L R U 6 8 15 2 12 7 1 (45.59 KiB) Viewed 27 times

Question 2. (25 pts.) Consider the following game which I refer to as Game 2: 1 2 C C2 GAME 2 L R U (6,8) (15,2) (12,7) (4,9) M (7,1) (12,11) (13, 12) (5,7) M (8,3) (4,4) (2,7) (9, 12) D (7,4) (6,6) (12,8) (10,2) a. (15 pts.) Find the iterated strict dominant strategy equilibrium of game 2. What are the rationality assumptions (player 1 knows player 1 is rational, player 1 knows that player 2 is rational and so on) that we need to have for getting that strategy profile as the dominated strategy equilibrium. Please be clear and concise in your answer. b. (10 pts.) Find all the minmax equilibrium of Game 2. Is it different than the iterated strict dominant strategy equilibrium? If so, why? How does this to part c of question 1?