This is my second time posting this question! Please read the question and write answers with an explanation. Some of yo

[answerhappygod]

This is my second time posting this question!
Please read the question and write answers with an explanation.Some of you guys just post the random non-related and waste ourtime. The question is economy theory of gaming question.
Amy (Player 1) and Beth (Player 2) have decided to dissolve abusiness part-nership whose assets have been valued at $100,000.The charter of the part- nership prescribes that the seniorpartner, Amy, make an offer concerning the division of the assetsto the junior partner, Beth. The junior partner can Ac- cept, inwhich case the proposed division is implemented, or Reject, inwhich case the case goes to litigation. Litigating involves a costof $20,000 in legal fees for each partner and the typ-ical verdictassigns 60% of the assets to the senior partner and the remaining40% to the junior partner. Suppose, for simplicity, that there isno uncer- tainty about the verdict. Suppose also that there areonly two possible offers that Amy can make: a 50-50 split or a70-30 split.
answer these please not some random you find online.
(a) Assuming that both Amy and Beth are selfish and greedy,represent this situation as an extensive game.
(b) Find the backward induction solution of the game in part(a).
(c) Find all the Nash equilibria of the game in part (a). Isthere a difference between the backward induction solution and theNash equilibria of this game?