(b) Now assume that the farmer is instead a wage-worker whose fallback utility is 0. Also assume that e is contractible

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B Now Assume That The Farmer Is Instead A Wage Worker Whose Fallback Utility Is 0 Also Assume That E Is Contractible 1 (110.54 KiB) Viewed 18 times

(b) Now assume that the farmer is instead a wage-worker whose fallback utility is 0. Also assume that e is contractible (it is possible to write an enforceable contract specifying a certain amount of e). The landowner who employs the farmer can make a TIOLI offer to the farmer. The TIOLI offer is a contract that the landowner offers to the farmer, which specifies wage w and amount of work e. The landowner wants to maximize her profits , given by the output produced by the farmer minus the wage she pays. So profits are given by π= X-W The farmer has the same utility function as before, and the same production function, and now his income is equal to the wage she receives: y=w. Write down the constrained optimization problem of the employer. Solve it, and find the amount of work e that the employer will want the farmer to do, and the wage w that the employer will offer. Compare the amount of work e that is performed in this case to the amount of work that was performed in that case of exercise (a), where the farmer kept her output after paying a fixed rent. What accounts for the difference (or absence of difference, based on what you find) between these two cases? (Hint: the employer wants to maximize profits , subject to some constraint. Given that she can make a TIOLI offer to the farmer, what is the employer constrained by?) (you can attach a word document or a PDF, or also a photo of legible hand-written work.)