Consider the following position auction setting. (a) Suppose our auction is a VCG auction with four positions and four b

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Consider the following position auction setting. (a) Suppose our auction is a VCG auction with four positions and four b

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Consider The Following Position Auction Setting A Suppose Our Auction Is A Vcg Auction With Four Positions And Four B 1
Consider The Following Position Auction Setting A Suppose Our Auction Is A Vcg Auction With Four Positions And Four B 1 (39.14 KiB) Viewed 29 times
Consider the following position auction setting. (a) Suppose our auction is a VCG auction with four positions and four bidding advertisers A, B, C, and D. The four positions have hourly click-through rates q = 10, q2-6, qı- 3, q=2. The bidders have per-click values (e.g the customer value upon the click) wa= $100/click, wn $50/click, wc = $20/click, and wo = $10/click. If the advertisers bid truthfully (i.e. bid b - w), what will the outcome be (i.e. what are the position allocation and payment for each advertiser) (b) Now suppose our auction is a GSP auction with the same four positions, four bidding advertisers A, B, C, and D, and the same hourly click-through rates and per-click values. If the advertisers bid truthfully (ie, bid b. - u), what will the outcome be (i.e. what are the position allocation and payment for each advertiser)?
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