Click to see additional instructions Consider If needed, graph values can be estimated to the nearest half-unit. A. At t

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Click to see additional instructions Consider If needed, graph values can be estimated to the nearest half-unit. A. At t

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Click To See Additional Instructions Consider If Needed Graph Values Can Be Estimated To The Nearest Half Unit A At T 1
Click To See Additional Instructions Consider If Needed Graph Values Can Be Estimated To The Nearest Half Unit A At T 1 (90.63 KiB) Viewed 14 times
Click to see additional instructions Consider If needed, graph values can be estimated to the nearest half-unit. A. At the threat point, the firm's payoff is and the union's payoff is (which is a gain of . The highest feasible payoff for the union is ). In this graph, the number of rounds of bargaining in which offers can be made is ) and the highest feasible payoff for the firm is (which is a gain of and the maximum gain for the union is . The union's relative delay costs in B. If an agreement is not reached in the first round of bargaining, the maximum gain for the firm is this figure are the firm's. (Enter "1" for higher than, "0" for the same as, or "-1" for lower than.) C. Suppose the firm makes the offer in the first round and the union will make the offer in the second round if agreement is not reached. In the first round, the firm knows that in the second round the highest feasible payoff for the union is . The firm will offer the union a payoff of in the first round and the union will this offer. (Enter "1" for accept, "0" for reject.) The . This is a gain of for the firm and a gain of for the union. in Rubinstein outcome gives the firm payoff and the union payoff D. Suppose instead the union makes the offer in the first round and the firm will make the offer in the second round if agreement is not reached. In this case, the union will offer the firm a payoff of the first round. The Rubinstein outcome in this case gives the firm payoff and union payoff . This is a gain of for the firm and a gain of for the union. E. When the firm goes first, the product of gains is . When the union goes first the product of gains is Shade these areas on a graph. Relative to when the firm goes first, the when the union gains are when the union goes first. (Enter "1" for higher, "0" for the same, "-1" for lower.) The magnitude of the difference between firm and union gains is goes first. (Enter "1" for higher, "0" for the same, "-1" for lower.) the above figure of non-cooperative bargaining with full information.
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