U 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 F Click to see additional instructions Consider the above figure of no

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U 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 F Click To See Additional Instructions Consider The Above Figure Of No 1 (103.05 KiB) Viewed 18 times

U 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 F Click to see additional instructions Consider the above figure of non-cooperative bargaining with full information. If needed, graph values can be estimated to the nearest half-unit. A. At the threat point, the firm's payoff is and the union's payoff is The highest feasible payoff for the union is (which is a gain of (which is a gain of ). In this graph, the number of rounds of bargaining in which offers can be made is and the maximum gain for the union is . The union's relative delay costs in this figure are B. If an agreement is not reached in the first round of bargaining, the maximum gain t the firm is than, "0" for the same as, or "-1" for lower than.) C. Suppose the firm makes the offer in the first round and the union will make the offer in the second round if agreement is not reached. In the first round, the firm knows that in the second round the highest feasible payoff for the union is payoff of in the first round and the union will this offer. (Enter "1" for accept, "0" for reject.) The Rubinstein outcome gives the firm payoff The firm will offer the union a This is a gain of and the union payoff for the firm and a gain of for the union. in the first round. The Rubinstein outcome in this case gives the firm payoff D. Suppose instead the union makes the offer in the first round and the firm will make the offer in the second round if agreement is not reached. In this case, the union will offer the firm a payoff of and union payoff . This is a gain of for the firm and a gain of for the union. E. When the firm goes first, the product of gains is When the union goes first the product of gains is when the union goes first. (Enter "1" .Shade these areas on a graph. Relative to when the firm goes first, the gains are when the union goes first. (Enter "1" for higher, "0" for the same, "-1" for lower.) for higher, "0" for the same, "-1" for lower.) The magnitude of the difference between firm and union gains is and the highest feasible payoff for the firm is the firm's. (Enter "1" for higher