C. D C. 4,4. -1,5 D. 5, -1. 0,0 Suppose that players simultaneously choose their strategy bef

[answerhappygod]

C.
D
C. 4,4. -1,5
D. 5, -1. 0,0
Suppose that players simultaneously choose their strategy before
the repeated game, and can’t change it once the repeated game has
started. Players can choose one of the three following strategies
as defined in class: • Always Defect • Grim-Trigger • Tit-For-Tat
(a) Draw the 3×3 matrix game with the payoffs for each strategy
pair calculated over the 10 periods. (Each row and each column
represent one of the three strategies) (b) What are the
pure-strategy Nash equilibria of game in part (a)? (c) Now suppose
now that player 2 make a mistake in period 2. That is if his
strategy is supposed to play C then he accidentally plays D, and if
his strategy is supposed to play D then he accidentally plays C.
Draw the 3×3 matrix game with the payoffs for each strategy pair
calculated over the 10 periods. (d) What are the pure-strategy Nash
equilibria of game in part (c)? (e) Now consider the new strategy
called Win-Stay, Lose Shift (WSLS): • Start with C • If the other
person plays C, then I repeat MY last action • If the other person
plays D, then I switch MY last action What sequence of actions is
played if both players play WSLS against each other, and player 2
makes a mistake in period 2. What are the payoffs for each player?
(f) Is this better than when both players play TFT against each
other, and player 2 makes a mistake in period 2?