- 3 Suppose Two Players Play The Following Prisoner S Dilemma For 10 Periods Periods 1 Through 10 Player 2 C D C 4 4 1 (10.22 KiB) Viewed 28 times
- 3 Suppose Two Players Play The Following Prisoner S Dilemma For 10 Periods Periods 1 Through 10 Player 2 C D C 4 4 2 (42.15 KiB) Viewed 28 times
Player 2 C D C 4 4 -1 5 Player 1 D 5-1 0 0 Suppose that players simultaneously choose their strat- egy before the repeated gate, and can't change it once the repeated game has started. Players can choose one of the three following strategies as defined index . Always Defect • Grim-Trigger • Tit-For-Tat (a) Draw the 3x3 matrix game with the payoffs for each strategy pair calculated over the 10 periods (Each row and each column represent one of the three strategies) (b) What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of game in part (a)? (C) Now suppose now that player 2 make a mistake in period 2. That is if his strategy is supposed to play then he accidentally plays D, and if his strategy is supposed to play then he accidentally plays C. Draw the 33 matrix game with the payoffs for each strategy pair calculated over the 10 periods. (a) What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of game in part (c)? (e) Now consider the new strategy called Win-Stay, Lose Shift (WSLS) • Start with • If the other person plays then I repeat MY Inst sction • If the other person plays D, then I switch MY last action What sequence of action is played if both plats play WSLS gainst each other, and player ma amike in period 2. What are the pots for coch player (1) the better than when both players play TFT ainst each other, and player 2 wake a mistake in period 27