An industry has three firms each of which produces output at a constant unit cost of $10 per unit. The demand function f

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An industry has three firms each of which produces output at aconstant unit cost of $10 per unit. The demand function for theindustry is q = 100-p. Firms compete in price in a Bertrandgame.
(a) Calculate the minimum δ that can sustain collusion if firmsuse a trigger strategy.
(b) Suppose that two firms merge, calculate the minimum δ thatcan sustain collusion after the merger.
(c) After the merger, the remaining two firms reach a crossshare holding agreement. Each of the two firms owns a share α ofits rival. The share is small enough for each firm to keep fullcontrol of its activities and decision. The rival is minorityshareholder and just receives a share α of the firm’s profits. Whatis the minimum δ that can sustain collusion if firms use a triggerstrategy? Is the likelihood of collusion affected by this crossshare holding agreement?