Consider the following simultaneous-move game and answer the following questions Player B L R U (3,2) (1,3) Player A D (

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Consider The Following Simultaneous Move Game And Answer The Following Questions Player B L R U 3 2 1 3 Player A D 1 (47.44 KiB) Viewed 83 times

Consider the following simultaneous-move game and answer the following questions Player B L R U (3,2) (1,3) Player A D (2,5) (4,4) i) ii) Find and draw the best response functions of the two players and show all Nash equilibria on the same diagram (5 marks) Find the payoffs of the players for the Nash equilibria in i) (2 marks) Suppose the game is changed and is now played sequentially. Let A plays first and B plays after observing A's move. Find the Nash equilibria and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game. (4 marks) Suppose the game is changed again and the simultaneous-move game is played repeatedly to infinity. Can the payoffs (4,4) be supported as equilibrium payoffs if players use Trigger strategies? (If a player deviates, let the other player punishes him by playing a Nash equilibrium strategy found in i)) Let a one-period discount value be a for A and B for B. Discuss all the possible Subgame Perfect equilibria. (9 marks) iv)