1 A Robber Decides Whether To Attack A Or Pass P And A Victim Simultaneously Decides Whether To Fight F Or Yield 1 (22.93 KiB) Viewed 55 times
1 A Robber Decides Whether To Attack A Or Pass P And A Victim Simultaneously Decides Whether To Fight F Or Yield 2 (22.93 KiB) Viewed 55 times
1 A Robber Decides Whether To Attack A Or Pass P And A Victim Simultaneously Decides Whether To Fight F Or Yield 3 (22.93 KiB) Viewed 55 times
1. A robber decides whether to attack (A) or pass (P) and a victim simultaneously decides whether to fight (F) or yield (Y). Victim is either weak or strong and the payoff matrices (where robber is the row player and victim is column player) corresponding to the two types are given as follows: When Strong (a probability) A P F Y -1,-1 2-2 0,1 0,0 When Weak (1-q probability) 9 F Y A -1,-3 2,-2 P 0,1 0,0 Find the set of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game.
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