Answer Happy

Game with three strategies.
Consider the following game:
(e) Suppose you use "simplified method" only for
strategies C and R,
ignoring L; that is,
you find a, b and c such
that u1(C,σ2) = u1(R,σ2). What values
of a, b and c you
obtain?
(f) Note that you would obtain the same equations for
player 2. Given (d), what values
of a, b, c, α, β and γ correspond
to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where players do not
play strategies L and l ?
Explain.
(g) Does the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium you found in
(f) continues to be a Nash equilibrium if I change the payoff
from (L,l ) to (100,100)?
(h) Does the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium you found in (f)
continues to be a Nash equilibrium if I change the payoff
from (L,c ) to (10,1)?
please answer all parts