Answer Happy

Please include an explanation to each question
1) In the game-theoretic analysis of tariff reaction functions of two governments, suppose that the equilibrium position has been attained (i.e., the countries are located at the intersection of their respective tariff reaction functions). If, from this equilibrium position, one country reduces its tariff rate while the other country does not change its tariff rate, the result, other things equal, is that the country that has reduced its tariff will experience a. an increase in its welfare b. no change in its welfare. c. a decrease in its welfare. d. an increase, no change, or a decrease in its welfare - cannot be determined without more information. 2) In a two-country world, the terms-of-trade impact of a tariff will definitely improve the welfare of the tariff-imposing country (assuming no retaliation) if the tariff- imposing country a. is a small country. b. already has a tariff rate that is greater than the "optimum" tariff rate. c. is situated in the "elastic" portion of its trading partner's offer curve. d. is situated in the "inelastic" portion of its trading partner's offer curve 3) Members of a customs union agree to: a. eliminate trade barriers among themselves and impose common external trade barriers b. eliminate trade barriers only among themselves c. eliminate internal and external trade barriers and allow the free movement of factors of production d. adopt a common currency e. adopt a common international economic policy 4) The following statement is false: a. Prohibitive tariffs are tariffs set so high as to eliminate imports. b. The importance of tariffs has declined in modern times. c. Import quotas are limitations on the value of imports. d. Import quotas are nontariff barriers. e. Tariffs have been traditionally used as a source of government income.