- 4 Consider The Following Three Player Game In Which Player 1 Chooses Rows S U D Players 2 Chooses Columns S2 1 (38.82 KiB) Viewed 36 times
4. Consider the following three-player game, in which player 1 chooses rows (S = {U.D)), players 2 chooses columns (S2 = (L,R}), and player 3 chooses boxes (S3 = (B1,B2)): В. B2 L R U (1,1,1) (1,0,1) D(0,1,0) (0,0,1) L R U (1,1,0) (0,0,0) D (1,1,1) (1,0,0) Each cell describes the payoffs to the three players (u1, U2, ug) from that strategy com- bination (a) (10 points) Does any player have strictly dominated strategies? If so, what are they? Does any player have weakly dominated strategies? If so, what are they? (b) (10 points) What strategies are eliminated through iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies? Is this game dominance solvable? (c) (10 points) Identify the set of all the (pure or mixed strategy) Nash equilibria for this game. (d) (20 points) Are the pure strategy Nash equilibria identified above also trembling hand perfect equilibria (THPE)? Justify your answer.