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7. (10 pts. Consider a prisoner's dilemma game of the following. Ben Alex Confess Deny Confess (1,1) (0,20) Deny (20,0)

Posted: Mon Apr 18, 2022 9:14 am
by answerhappygod
7 10 Pts Consider A Prisoner S Dilemma Game Of The Following Ben Alex Confess Deny Confess 1 1 0 20 Deny 20 0 1
7 10 Pts Consider A Prisoner S Dilemma Game Of The Following Ben Alex Confess Deny Confess 1 1 0 20 Deny 20 0 1 (12.81 KiB) Viewed 31 times
7 10 Pts Consider A Prisoner S Dilemma Game Of The Following Ben Alex Confess Deny Confess 1 1 0 20 Deny 20 0 2
7 10 Pts Consider A Prisoner S Dilemma Game Of The Following Ben Alex Confess Deny Confess 1 1 0 20 Deny 20 0 2 (22.88 KiB) Viewed 31 times
7. (10 pts. Consider a prisoner's dilemma game of the following. Ben Alex Confess Deny Confess (1,1) (0,20) Deny (20,0) (4,4) a) Find all pure strategy nash equilibria. (2 pts.)

b) Suppose that the prisoner's dilemma game is repeated once every year, forever. Firm i's payoff of the repeated game of the repeated game is a discounted sum of each year, starting with year 0. The payoff of the repeated game for Firm i is, Tt; = 2-oB! Ti je Where Tij is Firm i's jth year specific payoff. Suppose further that B = 0.9. Explain what a grim trigger strategy is in this game. Then, show (with calculations) how both firms using grim-trigger strategies is NOT a nash equilibrium. (4 pts.) c) Continuing from part b), what is the lowest value of that can support a grim-trigger strategy equilibrium? (4 pts.)