Answer Happy

Player 1 a b C d e 0,0 x, y x, 3 -2,4 f 3,5 0,7 4,0 0,5 Player 2 g 1,6 4, y 2,1 0,7 h -3,3 10,5 -4,-2 -7,3 Consider the payoff matrix above, and answer the following questions about this game. a) Suppose x = 4 and y = 3. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? b) Suppose * = 4 and y = 3. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? c) Suppose x = 4 and y = 3. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? d) Suppose * = 4 and y = 9. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? e) Suppose * = 4 and y = 9. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? f) Suppose x = 4 and y = 9. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game?