Answer Happy

Question 1. (25 pts.) Consider the following game which I refer to as Game 1: 1\2 L с R U (3,5) (1.0) (9,7) GAME 1 M (4,1) (9.8) (10.9) D (0,0) (3,3) (0,4) a. (10 pts.) Find the strict dominant strategy equilibrium of Game 1. What are the rationality assumptions (player 1 knows player 1 is rational and so on) that we need to have for getting that strategy profile as the dominant strategy equilibrium. b. (10 pts.) Find all the minmax equilibrium of Game 1. Are any of them different than the strict dominant strategy equilibrium? c. (5 pts.) Suppose a game possesses a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium. Then, can there be a minmax equilibrium that is different from the strict dominant strategy equilibrium? If yes, give a well specified example. If not, present the detailed argument why.