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Question 13 Not yet answered Marked out of 2.00 P Flag question In this common-knowledge, simultaneous move game there are two players. The players have two strategies available, abbreviated as L and R. The payoffs for the strategies are as follows: • If both players select L, they each get a payoff of O. • If both players select R, they each get a payoff of O. • If player 1 selects R and player 2 selects L, player 1 gets a payoff of 4 and player 2 gets a payoff of 2. If player 1 selects L and player 2 selects R, player 1 gets a payoff of 2 and player 2 gets a payoff of 4. . The pure Nash equilibria for this game are| (RL) and (L,R) - Let p be the probability Player 1 plays L and let q be the probability Player 2 plays L. and q will be In the mixed Nash Equilibrium p will be (Hint: the payoffs in the game are symmetric)