Answer Happy

In this common-knowledge, simultaneous move game there are two players. The players have two strategies available, abbreviated as H and L. The payoffs for the strategies are as follows: • If both players select H, they each get a payoff of 0. • If both players select L, they each get a payoff of 0. • If player 1 selects L and player 2 selects H, player 1 gets a payoff of 2 and player 2 gets a payoff of 1. If player 1 selects Hand player 2 selects L, player 1 gets a payoff of 1 and player 2 gets a payoff of 2. The pure Nash equilibria for this game are Let p be the probability Player 1 plays H and let q be the probability Player 2 plays H. In the mixed Nash Equilibrium p will be p and q will be (Hint: the payoffs in the game are symmetric)