Answer Happy

Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2.
Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions L or R. These
choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1
plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0, 0) for Player 1 and 2,
respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1
plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players get 0
if the combination of actions is (B, R). If it exists, what is the
mixed strategy equilibrium of the game?
A. None of the answers are correct
B. (α* = 5/9, β* = 7/11), where α is the probability that 1
plays T and β is the probability that 2 plays L
C. (α* = 3/6, β* = 5/7), where α is the probability that 1 plays
T and β is the probability that 2 plays L
D. (α* = 6/11, β* = 7/9), where α is the probability that 1
plays T and β is the probability that 2 plays L
E. (α* = 7/9, β* = 6/11), where α is the probability that 1
plays T and β is the probability that 2 plays L