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Posted: **Sun Jun 05, 2022 9:50 pm**

: This Problem Statement Applies For Questions 1 A 1 B 1 C And 1 D Below Consider The Following Game Macarthur Air Se 1 (55.53 KiB) Viewed 53 times

: This Problem Statement Applies For Questions 1 A 1 B 1 C And 1 D Below Consider The Following Game Macarthur Air Se 2 (24.27 KiB) Viewed 53 times

: This Problem Statement Applies For Questions 1 A 1 B 1 C And 1 D Below Consider The Following Game Macarthur Air Se 3 (32.4 KiB) Viewed 53 times

: This Problem Statement Applies For Questions 1 A 1 B 1 C And 1 D Below Consider The Following Game Macarthur Air Se 4 (36.45 KiB) Viewed 53 times

This problem statement applies for questions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, and 1.d below. Consider the following game: MacArthur Air Sea Land Air 0,3 2,0 1,7 Patton Sea 2,4 0,6 2,0 Land 1, 3 2,4 0,3 Question 1.a. What is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game? Patton selects [Choose ] MacArthur selects [Choose ] Air Land Sea
Question 1.b. What are the payoffs associated with the pure strategy Nash equilibrium? Use the (Patton's payoff, MacArthur payoff) format. O (2,4) O (0, 3) O (1,7) O (0,6)
Question 1.c. Following the mixed strategy equilibrium concept, which fraction of times should Patton play each strategy? Air [Choose ] [Choose ] ✓ [Choose ] 1/3 3/7 2/7 Sea Land 13 35 27
Question 1.c. Following the mixed strategy equilibrium concept, which fraction of times should MacArthur play each strategy? Air [Choose ] [Choose ] ✓ [Choose ] 3/7 2/7 1/3 Sea Land