- Consider The Three Player Game G With The Payoffs Given In Table 1 Player 1 May Choose Table 1 Payoffs Of G U D L R L 1 (374.1 KiB) Viewed 42 times
Consider the three-player game G with the payoffs given in Table 1. (Player 1 may choose Table 1: Payoffs of G U D L R L R N (2, 1, 2) (0,0,0) (0, 0, 0) E (1,0,1) (2, 1, 2) (2,1,2) (2, 1, 2) (1, 0, 1) (0,0,0) (2, 1, 2) D) ( W (2, 1, 2) (2, 1, 2) (0, 0, 0) S (1, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1) (2,1,2) each of the rows N, E, W, S, Player 2 each of the columns L, R, and Player 3 each of the two matrices U, D.) Let (p, q, r, s), (y, 1-y), and (z, 1-z) be typical mixed strategies of Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3, respectively. . Find all mixed Nash equilibria ((p, q, r, s), (y, 1 - y), (z, 1 – z)) such that the strategies of 2 and 3 are both completely mixed (i.e., 0 <y, z < 1).