Answer Happy

Two colleagues, Leila and Junshang, share an office which needs some cleaning. Both would like a clean office. However, each of them prefers not to be the one that does that cleaning. Here's the payoff matrix of the game between Leila and Junshang. Junshang Clean Don't Clean Clean 3, 3 3,4 Leila Don't Clean 4, 3 1, 1
(e) What is the risk dominant strategy for Leila? Select one: a. Clean b. Don't Clean C. Both d. Neither e. Not possible to say Clear my choice
(f) What is the risk-dominant strategy for Jun? Select one: a. Clean b. Don't Clean C. Both d. Neither e. Not possible to say Clear my choice
(g) What is the risk-dominant equilibrium of the game between Leila and Jun (if there is one)? Select one: a. (Clean, Clean) b. (Clean, Don't Clean) c. (Don't Clean, Clean) d. (Don't Clean, Don't Clean) e. There is no risk-dominant equilibrium. Clear my choice