Answer Happy

Thuli and Ntando are deciding what to do on a Saturday morning. Ntando wants to go hiking while Thuli wants to go swimming. Thuli does not enjoy hiking as much as swimming and Ntando does not enjoy swimming as much as hiking. Consider the following payoff matrix from a "Battle of the Sexes" game played between Thuli and Ntando to answer the question: Thuli Swimming Hiking 3 0 Swimming Ntando 2 0 2 Hiking 0 3 What is/are the Nash Equilibrium/Equilibria (Ntando, Thuli) if this "Battle of the Sexes" game is played only once? A. (2,3) only. B. (0,0) only. C. (3,2) only. D. Both (2,3) and (3,2). E. There is no stable Nash Equilibrium 0