Answer Happy

Question 1. (15 points) Answer the following questions for each of the games below a) How many stategies (complete plans of action) are available to each player? List all the possible strategies for each player. b) Identify the rollback equilibrium outcome and the optimal strategy to each player. (a) 13,0 MINERVA 12,1 11,1 ALBUS 15,0 4,4 11,5 3,3 ALBUS 0,4 #2.2 3,1 1.31 2.40 0,2.3 b 4.1.5 ALBUS 2.1.1 Question 2. (15 points) For the two-player game (a) in the previous question a) Write the game in strategic form, making Alubs the Row player and Minerva the Column player. Find all Nash equilibria b) For those equilibria you found in part (A) of this question that are not subgame-perfect, identify the reason. (b) ALBUS (d) N MINERVA - E S MINERVA MINERVA N MINERVA MINERVA b C SEVERUS N5,2 ALBUS MINERVA 0,44 N b