Problem from the Game theory course
Posted: Fri May 20, 2022 6:39 pm
Problem from the Game theory course
Question 3 (Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium) a) A society is made up of tea drinkers and coffee drinkers. Matches between different types get the following payoffs: player 2 player 1 Coffee Tea Coffee 2,2 0,0 Tea 0,0 1,1 Characterize evolutionary stable societies! Demonstrate, why such societies are evolutionary stable! b) Individuals in a society can come as managers or workers. If a manager is paired with a worker, this also raises the payoff of the worker, although it raises the payoff of the manager even more. player 2 player 1 Manager Worker Manager 0,0 5,2 Worker 2,5 1,1 What is the share of managers and workers in an evolutionary stable equilibrium? c) Consider the following variant of the evolutionary game in part a). Is a society where 1/2 of the population are coffee drinkers and the other 1/2 are tea drinkers evolutionary stable? Demonstrate, how you get your answer! player 2 player 1 Coffee Tea Coffee 1,1 0,0 Tea 0,0 1,1
Question 3 (Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium) a) A society is made up of tea drinkers and coffee drinkers. Matches between different types get the following payoffs: player 2 player 1 Coffee Tea Coffee 2,2 0,0 Tea 0,0 1,1 Characterize evolutionary stable societies! Demonstrate, why such societies are evolutionary stable! b) Individuals in a society can come as managers or workers. If a manager is paired with a worker, this also raises the payoff of the worker, although it raises the payoff of the manager even more. player 2 player 1 Manager Worker Manager 0,0 5,2 Worker 2,5 1,1 What is the share of managers and workers in an evolutionary stable equilibrium? c) Consider the following variant of the evolutionary game in part a). Is a society where 1/2 of the population are coffee drinkers and the other 1/2 are tea drinkers evolutionary stable? Demonstrate, how you get your answer! player 2 player 1 Coffee Tea Coffee 1,1 0,0 Tea 0,0 1,1