Negotiation Overview The Chinese government invited three companies to bid on supplying a large facility in the city of
Posted: Fri May 20, 2022 9:32 am
Negotiation Overview
The Chinese government invited three companies to bid on
supplying a large facility in the city of Lanzhou with a specific
technology—called the Trilliamp Process—used in the production of
ethylene.
These companies were: the Japanese company Auger-Aiso
(recommended by the inventor of the process, Mr. Trillamp, as the
most capable supplier) and two U.S. companies—Federal Electric and
Pressure, Inc. All three organizations were asked to compete for a
multi-million-dollar sales negotiation contract.
To undertake the negotiations with the three prospective
sellers, six Chinese officials and three representatives from the
Bank of China were selected.
The Auger-Aiso chief negotiator was Todman Glazer, the company’s
Japan branch manager from the United States who resided in Tokyo
and was assisted by his Japanese colleagues. This was the first
potential sales deal with China in the ethylene market, and
Auger-Aiso had previously faced stiff competition from Pressure,
Inc. for other deals.
The First Week of Negotiations
At the first sales negotiation meeting in Beijing, the Chinese
insisted that custom required the visitor—Glazer—to make the first
sales negotiation presentation. This he did, even though he was
trained to allow his opponents to speak first.
Glazer began by extolling the excellence of Auger-Aiso
technology, explaining that the manufacturing would all be done in
Japan to ensure product excellence. When the Chinese offered no
indication of their position or sales price, Glazer's training
taught him to quote an upper-range price that would allow
flexibility. The Chinese still made no comment.
In the afternoon, the Chinese heard sales negotiation offers
from the Pressure, Inc. team, and then from Federal Electric. By
the end of the day, Federal Electric, having been given the
impression that its rivals were radically lowering their prices,
dropped out of the sales negotiation race, accepting that it could
not compete.
During the first week of negotiations, a pattern emerged. The
Chinese would meet with Glazer and his colleagues in the morning
and ask for a price, saying that their competitors had already bid
such-and-such a price, which was invariably lower than the last
Auger-Aiso bid. They would then meet with Pressure, Inc. in the
afternoon and use the same sales negotiation tactic, causing the
latter to drop its price. Moreover, each meeting would end with the
Chinese saying, “We will call you tomorrow.”
But, because they never called, both Pressure, Inc. and
Auger-Aiso became panicky and visited the Chinese office without
notice to present an even lower bid. As the Chinese kept the
vendors guessing and in the dark, Glazer began to understand how
the Chinese had earned a reputation as master negotiators.
The Second Week of Negotiations
During the second week, sales negotiation tactics changed and
there were different people representing the Chinese side. An
antagonist would suddenly burst out in loud Chinese and harangue
the Auger-Aiso side for some fifteen minutes, complaining about the
quality of the machines they were offering. A protagonist would
then intervene and, apologizing for his colleague, explain that his
colleague had been upset about the current sales negotiation
situation.
Glazer regarded these outbursts as no more than a “Good Cop/Bad
Cop” sales negotiation tactic, designed to make the protagonist
appear more trustworthy to the foreigners. But, Glazer realized,
all the participants had likely been play-acting.
Then there was yet another change. The Chinese located the
Auger-Aiso and Pressure, Inc. teams near the meeting room, in
adjacent rooms.
Pressure, Inc. would be called in and asked for its best sales
price.
After the team had returned to its room, Auger-Aiso would be
called in, told the latest offer from Pressure, Inc., and asked if
it could beat it.
When the prospective vendors could drop their price no lower,
they would add something to the package. Auger, for example, added
oil gauges for its turbines, effectively a three-percent add-on.
Even so, the Chinese's negotiation team remained uncommitted.
Glazer could hardly believe that he had lowered his price twenty
per-cent that week; to do so would have been out of the question in
the United States. On the final day, Auger-Aiso made another sales
negotiation offer—and, for the first time, the Chinese made a
counter offer. Auger-Aiso accepted, and agreement was reached.
Glazer believed that Auger-Aiso had been awarded the contract
because it had been the preferred supplier right from the
start.
Questions to consider:
1. Was Glazer’s strategy of beginning with an “upper range”
offer wise? What are the drawbacks of that strategy?
2. What might have happened if Glazer had quoted a realistic
offer and then stuck by it, refusing to lower his price “in the
dark”?
3. How could either company have justified lowering their prices
so dramatically?
4. During the second week, what changes did the Chinese make to
throw the two vendors off balance?
5. The Chinese set the rules of the game, but did either company
really have to play by those rules? How could either company have
taken a stand?
6. What logistical advantage, from the very beginning, did
Auger-Aiso have?
7. If Glazer suspected his company was actually preferred by the
Chinese, why did he feel compelled to be low bid?
The Chinese government invited three companies to bid on
supplying a large facility in the city of Lanzhou with a specific
technology—called the Trilliamp Process—used in the production of
ethylene.
These companies were: the Japanese company Auger-Aiso
(recommended by the inventor of the process, Mr. Trillamp, as the
most capable supplier) and two U.S. companies—Federal Electric and
Pressure, Inc. All three organizations were asked to compete for a
multi-million-dollar sales negotiation contract.
To undertake the negotiations with the three prospective
sellers, six Chinese officials and three representatives from the
Bank of China were selected.
The Auger-Aiso chief negotiator was Todman Glazer, the company’s
Japan branch manager from the United States who resided in Tokyo
and was assisted by his Japanese colleagues. This was the first
potential sales deal with China in the ethylene market, and
Auger-Aiso had previously faced stiff competition from Pressure,
Inc. for other deals.
The First Week of Negotiations
At the first sales negotiation meeting in Beijing, the Chinese
insisted that custom required the visitor—Glazer—to make the first
sales negotiation presentation. This he did, even though he was
trained to allow his opponents to speak first.
Glazer began by extolling the excellence of Auger-Aiso
technology, explaining that the manufacturing would all be done in
Japan to ensure product excellence. When the Chinese offered no
indication of their position or sales price, Glazer's training
taught him to quote an upper-range price that would allow
flexibility. The Chinese still made no comment.
In the afternoon, the Chinese heard sales negotiation offers
from the Pressure, Inc. team, and then from Federal Electric. By
the end of the day, Federal Electric, having been given the
impression that its rivals were radically lowering their prices,
dropped out of the sales negotiation race, accepting that it could
not compete.
During the first week of negotiations, a pattern emerged. The
Chinese would meet with Glazer and his colleagues in the morning
and ask for a price, saying that their competitors had already bid
such-and-such a price, which was invariably lower than the last
Auger-Aiso bid. They would then meet with Pressure, Inc. in the
afternoon and use the same sales negotiation tactic, causing the
latter to drop its price. Moreover, each meeting would end with the
Chinese saying, “We will call you tomorrow.”
But, because they never called, both Pressure, Inc. and
Auger-Aiso became panicky and visited the Chinese office without
notice to present an even lower bid. As the Chinese kept the
vendors guessing and in the dark, Glazer began to understand how
the Chinese had earned a reputation as master negotiators.
The Second Week of Negotiations
During the second week, sales negotiation tactics changed and
there were different people representing the Chinese side. An
antagonist would suddenly burst out in loud Chinese and harangue
the Auger-Aiso side for some fifteen minutes, complaining about the
quality of the machines they were offering. A protagonist would
then intervene and, apologizing for his colleague, explain that his
colleague had been upset about the current sales negotiation
situation.
Glazer regarded these outbursts as no more than a “Good Cop/Bad
Cop” sales negotiation tactic, designed to make the protagonist
appear more trustworthy to the foreigners. But, Glazer realized,
all the participants had likely been play-acting.
Then there was yet another change. The Chinese located the
Auger-Aiso and Pressure, Inc. teams near the meeting room, in
adjacent rooms.
Pressure, Inc. would be called in and asked for its best sales
price.
After the team had returned to its room, Auger-Aiso would be
called in, told the latest offer from Pressure, Inc., and asked if
it could beat it.
When the prospective vendors could drop their price no lower,
they would add something to the package. Auger, for example, added
oil gauges for its turbines, effectively a three-percent add-on.
Even so, the Chinese's negotiation team remained uncommitted.
Glazer could hardly believe that he had lowered his price twenty
per-cent that week; to do so would have been out of the question in
the United States. On the final day, Auger-Aiso made another sales
negotiation offer—and, for the first time, the Chinese made a
counter offer. Auger-Aiso accepted, and agreement was reached.
Glazer believed that Auger-Aiso had been awarded the contract
because it had been the preferred supplier right from the
start.
Questions to consider:
1. Was Glazer’s strategy of beginning with an “upper range”
offer wise? What are the drawbacks of that strategy?
2. What might have happened if Glazer had quoted a realistic
offer and then stuck by it, refusing to lower his price “in the
dark”?
3. How could either company have justified lowering their prices
so dramatically?
4. During the second week, what changes did the Chinese make to
throw the two vendors off balance?
5. The Chinese set the rules of the game, but did either company
really have to play by those rules? How could either company have
taken a stand?
6. What logistical advantage, from the very beginning, did
Auger-Aiso have?
7. If Glazer suspected his company was actually preferred by the
Chinese, why did he feel compelled to be low bid?