1) Which of the following is true of all social insurance programs? The initiation of payments depends on the occurence
Posted: Thu May 19, 2022 10:29 am
1)
Which of the following is true of all social insurance
programs?
The initiation of payments depends on the occurence of some kind
of event in a person's life.
They are paid for by funds contributed only by employers.
Whether a person receives payments is contingent on the wealth
and/or income of the covered person.
They are paid for by funds contibuted only by employees.
2)
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem refers to:
the difficulty of attaining a Lindahl equilibrium.
the fact that there are many equivalent ways to aggregate
individual preferences into a consistent aggregate decision but the
different methods do not yield the same outcomes.
the idea that no general voting rule can be devised to
consistently maximize the well-being of the citizens.
the fact that the outcome of the median voter model cannot
possibly be a socially efficient outcome.
3)
Voter
Type
Type 1 Type 2 Type
3
Percentage
of Electorate 25% 55% 20% (For
simplicity assume 100 voters
First choice A B C in
the electorate)
Second choice B C A
Third choice C A B
With the Borda count, method, B is preferred to C which in turn
is preferred to A. Does the system display "independence of
irrelevant alternatives"?
No; if we eliminate C, now A is preferred to B.
No; if we eliminate A, now C is preferred to B.
Yes; the order of the preferences remains the same.
No; if we eliminate B, now A is preferred to C.
Two of the "No" answers are correct.
Which of the following is true of all social insurance
programs?
The initiation of payments depends on the occurence of some kind
of event in a person's life.
They are paid for by funds contributed only by employers.
Whether a person receives payments is contingent on the wealth
and/or income of the covered person.
They are paid for by funds contibuted only by employees.
2)
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem refers to:
the difficulty of attaining a Lindahl equilibrium.
the fact that there are many equivalent ways to aggregate
individual preferences into a consistent aggregate decision but the
different methods do not yield the same outcomes.
the idea that no general voting rule can be devised to
consistently maximize the well-being of the citizens.
the fact that the outcome of the median voter model cannot
possibly be a socially efficient outcome.
3)
Voter
Type
Type 1 Type 2 Type
3
Percentage
of Electorate 25% 55% 20% (For
simplicity assume 100 voters
First choice A B C in
the electorate)
Second choice B C A
Third choice C A B
With the Borda count, method, B is preferred to C which in turn
is preferred to A. Does the system display "independence of
irrelevant alternatives"?
No; if we eliminate C, now A is preferred to B.
No; if we eliminate A, now C is preferred to B.
Yes; the order of the preferences remains the same.
No; if we eliminate B, now A is preferred to C.
Two of the "No" answers are correct.