1) The debt ceiling disputes that arise in the U.S. Congress over whether to raise the ceiling to allow more borrowing a
Posted: Thu May 19, 2022 10:29 am
1)
The debt ceiling disputes that arise in the U.S. Congress over
whether to raise the ceiling to allow more borrowing and
spending could arise from widespread acceptance of:
direct democracy.
the theory of size-maximizing bureaucracy.
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
Leviathan theory.
the median voter model.
2)
Voter
Type
Type 1 Type 2 Type
3
Percentage
of Electorate 25% 55% 20% (For
simplicity assume 100 voters
First choice A B C in
the electorate)
Second choice B C A
Third choice C A B
In a Borda count, how many points would choice C gain?
185.
170.
195.
235.
3)
Voter
Type
Type 1 Type 2 Type
3
Percentage
of Electorate 25% 55% 20% (For
simplicity assume 100 voters
First choice A B C in
the electorate)
Second choice B C A
Third choice C A B
For the table shown with pairwise majority voting answer
these two questions: (1) are the preferences intransitive?;
(2) what is the order of preferences?
No intransitivity; B is preferred to both A and C, and C is
preferred to A.
No intransitivity; C is preferred to both A and B, and B is
preferred to A.
Yes -intransitivity; A is preferred to B and B is preferred to
C, yet C seems preferred to A.
Yes, intransitivity; C is preferred to B and B is preferred to
A, yet A seems preferred to C.
The debt ceiling disputes that arise in the U.S. Congress over
whether to raise the ceiling to allow more borrowing and
spending could arise from widespread acceptance of:
direct democracy.
the theory of size-maximizing bureaucracy.
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
Leviathan theory.
the median voter model.
2)
Voter
Type
Type 1 Type 2 Type
3
Percentage
of Electorate 25% 55% 20% (For
simplicity assume 100 voters
First choice A B C in
the electorate)
Second choice B C A
Third choice C A B
In a Borda count, how many points would choice C gain?
185.
170.
195.
235.
3)
Voter
Type
Type 1 Type 2 Type
3
Percentage
of Electorate 25% 55% 20% (For
simplicity assume 100 voters
First choice A B C in
the electorate)
Second choice B C A
Third choice C A B
For the table shown with pairwise majority voting answer
these two questions: (1) are the preferences intransitive?;
(2) what is the order of preferences?
No intransitivity; B is preferred to both A and C, and C is
preferred to A.
No intransitivity; C is preferred to both A and B, and B is
preferred to A.
Yes -intransitivity; A is preferred to B and B is preferred to
C, yet C seems preferred to A.
Yes, intransitivity; C is preferred to B and B is preferred to
A, yet A seems preferred to C.