Answer Happy

3. Consider the preferences of three groups of individuals among three candidates: Group (% of pop) Group 1 (30%) Group 2 (33%) Group 3 (37%) 11 Jac Van Kim 2nd Van Kim Van 3rd Kim Jac Jac a a. Plurality voting: If each group votes for their top choice, which candidate would win the majority of the votes? b. Suppose that Van drops out of the race, which candidate would win the majority of the votes if each picks their top choice? Which of Arrow's conditions, if any, would this outcome violate? c. Plurality with runoff. Suppose that the top two vote getters in the first round face a runoff. Which candidate would win? d. Suppose voting is by head-to-head voting (Condorcet). Which candidate would win? Does the order of the head-to-head runoffs impact the winner? Which, if any, are any of Arrow's conditions violated? e. Suppose ranked voting is used where the top preference gets 2 votes, the second choice gets 1 vote and the third choice gets 0. Which candidate wins under Borda Count/Ranked voting? f. Suppose Group approves of all three candidates, Group two approves of Van and Kim and Group three approves of only Kim. Using approval voting, which candidate would win? 4. Suppose there are 100 voters with preferences for a public good: Group A: 51 voters get net MB of $5 Group B: 49 voters get net MB of -$10 a. Would this be approved under majority rule vote? b. Does approving the project increase or decrease overall surplus of voters?