Answer Happy

. . You are given the following two scenarios: A competitive risk neutral market maker clears the market for trading in an asset where there are two traders: (i) an uninformed noise trader and (ii) an informed trader. The latter has perfect information about the true value of the asset, which is 110 or 90. The market maker thinks the two prices are equally likely. The uninformed trader buys one unit or sells one unit of the asset with equal probability. The true value of the asset is now normally distributed with a mean of 100. The uninformed trades, designated 'u', are normally distributed with a mean of zero. The informed trader assumes that the market maker sets the price at Po + 2y, where Po is the mean of the price distribution and y is the aggregate order flow. The trader takes the view that the share is worth 'V', assumed to be 106 in this case. Calculate the expected profits for the informed trader in both cases, making clear your line of reasoning.