Answer Happy

Suppose that two players are playing the following game.
Player 1 can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player 2 can choose
either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following
table:
where the number on the left is the payoff to Player 1, and the
number on the right is the payoff to Player 2.

A) (2 points) Does Player 1 have a dominant strategy, and if so
what is it? [ Select ]
["Yes; Top", "Yes; Bottom", "Yes; Left", "Yes;
Right", "No; Player 1 does not have a dominant
strategy"]

B) (2 points) Does Player 2 have a dominant strategy and if so what
is it? [ Select ]
["Yes; Top", "Yes; Bottom", "Yes; Left", "Yes;
Right", "No; Player 2 does not have a dominant
strategy"]

C) (1 point each) For each of the following strategy combinations,
select TRUE if it is a Nash Equilibrium, and FALSE if it is
not:
D) (2 points) What is Player 1’s maximin strategy?
[ Select ]
["Top", "Bottom", "Left", "Right", "Player 1 does not have a
maximin strategy"]

E) (2 points) What is Player 2’s maximin strategy?
[ Select ]
["Top", "Bottom", "Left", "Right", "Player 2 does not have a
maximin strategy"]

F) (2 points) If the game were played with Player 1 moving first
and Player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method we
went over in class, what strategy will each player
choose? [ Select ]
["Player 1 chooses Top; Player 2 chooses Left",
"Player 1 chooses Top; Player 2 chooses Right", "Player 1 chooses
Bottom; Player 2 chooses Left", "Player 1 chooses Bottom; Player 2
chooses Right"]