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Question D2. An Aggressor country is threatening to attack another victim country. The victim country has allies who will come to their defence if they are attacked, however, the amount of troops the ally sends can be either small or large. The victim knows how many troops will be sent but the aggressor does not, the aggressor believes the probability the force is large is p. The game faced by the countries is depicted below. Victim "Large force" Defend Capitulate (-50,-20) (100,-50) (0,-10) (0,0) Aggressor Attack Don't Attack Victim "Small force" Defend Capitulate (50,-80) (100,-50) (0,-10) (0,0) Aggressor Attack Don't Attack a) Define what it means for a game to have incomplete information and explain how a game with unknown payoffs can be thought of as such a game. b) Write down a combined payoff matrix that includes strategies for the victim that are conditional on their type and use this to work out the Bayesian-Nash Equilibria for this game.