Answer Happy

3. Suppose that two firms compete in quantities (Cournot) in a market in which demand is described by P = 260 - 2Q. Each firm incurs no fixed cost but has a marginal cost of 20. A. What is the one-period Nash equilibrium market price? What is the output and profit of each firm in this equilibrium? B. What is the output of each firm if they collude to produce the monopoly output? What profit does each firm earn with such collusion?
4. Return to Problem 3 above. Suppose that after the cartel is established, one firm decides to cheat on the collusion, assuming that the other firm will continue to produce its half of the monopoly output. A. Given the deviating firm's assumption, how much will it produce? B. If the deviating firm's assumption is correct, what will be the industry price and the deviating firm's profit in this case?