1. Consider n > 3 bidders who have private valuations; these valuations are indepen- dently and uniformly distributed on
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1. Consider n > 3 bidders who have private valuations; these valuations are indepen- dently and uniformly distributed on
1. Consider n > 3 bidders who have private valuations; these valuations are indepen- dently and uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Now suppose bidders submit sealed bids and the highest bid wins the auction but pays the third highest bid. Com- pute an equilibrium and the expected revenue to the seller in this auction.
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