Consider the following game. Player 1 must choose one action from the set {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶}, Player 2 mu

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Consider the following game. Player 1 must choose one action
from the set {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶}, Player 2 must choose one action from the
set {𝐴, 𝐵}. Players move in a sequence: Player 1 moves first; then
moves player 2. When player 2 has to move he is only partially
informed about the choice of player 1: he can see if player 1 chose
𝐴 but he cannot discriminate if player 1 chose B or C The payoff of
each player is given by the following rule: if both players have
chosen 𝐴 they get a payoff of 30 if both players have chosen 𝐵 they
get a payoff of 20 If the two players have chosen two different
actions they get a payoff of 0
a) Represent this situation using the extensive form
b) How many information sets and subgames does this game
have?
c) Find all Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria